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Under certain circumstances individuals and groups are prepared to undertake radical political action. In this chapter we address the questions of when and why people are inclined to take part in more radical political activities. We take it that nobody is born radical, but that radical political actions result from processes of radicalization. In the following pages, we will first define what the process of radicalization is like, and then discuss what the causes of radicalization are. Although radicalization can be observed among many different groups, we will concentrate in this section mostly on radicalizing Islamists. 
What is Radicalization?
Social psychological work on the radicalization of intergroup conflict rarely builds on empirical data, perhaps because radicalization is complicated to study due to its elusive and often clandestine character. Therefore, social psychological literature lacks a deep understanding of the dynamics of radical intergroup conflict. In this chapter, we venture an initial conceptualization of radicalization. But before we do so we discuss two interrelated though different group processes that are nested in the process of radicalization, namely: politicization and polarization. 
Politicization
Politicization of a collective implies that people “intentionally engage, as a mindful and self-conscious collective (or as representatives thereof), in a power struggle knowing that it is the wider, more inclusive societal context in which this struggle takes place and needs to be orchestrated accordingly” (Simon & Klandermans, 2001, p. 323). Typically, a process of politicization begins with the awareness of shared grievances. Next, an external enemy is blamed for these grievances and claims for compensation are made. In the final step to politicization, the group will directly or indirectly aim its actions toward the general public or the authorities (Simon & Klandermans, 2001). Conflicts take place in a wider, more inclusive societal context. When bipolar conflicts are augmented by involving society (or even the world) at large, the societal context is differentiated into opponents and (potential) allies. Bystanders must choose sides in a conflict: become allies or opponents. This involves strategic reformulation of the conflict issue such that it appeals to potential allies (Gerhards & Rucht, 1992; Snow, Rochford, Worden, & Benford, 1986). Politicization of collective identity and the underlying power struggle unfolds as a sequence of politicizing events that gradually transform the group’s relationship to its social environment. In the 1990s, Islamic migrants were perceived in terms of their ethnic background throughout Western Europe; their ethnic identities were identity markers. After 9/11 and the so-called “war on terror” waged by the Bush administration, Dutch Turks and Moroccans, British Pakistanis, French Algerians, among others, became Muslims. 
Polarization
We conceive of polarization as an instance of movement/counter-movement dynamics in which the in- and out-group “keep each other alive” (Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996). In-group and out-group mutually reinforce each other, identifying themselves in opposition to each other and regarding the other as the main target of their collective actions. When groups polarize, a strict distinction between “us” and “them” evolves. Both groups assert that what “we” stand for is threatened by “them,” tribute is paid to the in-group’s symbols and values, and the out-group is derogated. 
Radicalization
We conceptualize radicalization as a collective intergroup process. People do not radicalize on their own but as part of a group and through the socially constructed “reality” of their group. Radicalization and intergroup conflict are in this sense interpreted as collective processes first and foremost. Indeed, radicalization is an intergroup process in which identification interacts with characteristics of the socio-political context to shape and mold trajectories of change in individuals and groups. Konaev and Moghaddam (in press), for example, showed how President Bush of the United States and President Ahmadinejad of Iran influenced both in-group and out-group through their actions, resulting in a process of mutual radicalization. These two leaders radicalized each other as well as their respective constituencies. Moghaddam (2005), presenting a view of the world “from the terrorists’ point of view,” conceives of the process of radicalization as a multi-story building with a staircase at its center. People are located on different floors of the building, but everyone begins on the ground floor. Thought and action on each floor are characterized by particular psychological processes. On the ground floor, the most important psychological processes influencing behavior are subjective interpretations of material conditions, perceptions of fairness, and adequacy of identity. Only some individuals move up from the ground floor to the first floor, in search of ways to improve their life conditions. These individuals attempt to improve their own situation and that of their groups. On this floor – the floor of politicization – they are particularly influenced by possibilities for individual mobility and voice. When people feel their voice is listened to during the decision-making process, they “buy into” the system. However, when they feel they have no voice, they become more dissatisfied and detached. Some of these dissatisfied individuals climb up to the second floor – the floor of polarization – where they come under the influence of persuasive messages telling them that the cause of their problems is external enemies. Many of the individuals who climb up to the second floor remain there, but some keep climbing up to reach the third floor, where they adopt a morality supportive of radicalization. Gradually, those who have reached the third floor become separated from the mainstream norms and values of their society, which generally condemn radical activism. They take on a view supportive of an “ends justify the means” approach. Those individuals who continue to climb up to the fourth floor adopt a more rigid style of categorical “us versus them,” “good against evil” thinking. Their world is now unambiguously divided into “black and white”; it is seen as legitimate to attack “the forces of evil” in each and every way feasible. Eventually, some of these individuals move up to the fifth floor and take part in and directly support terrorist actions.
The higher people move up the staircase to radicalization, the lower the degrees of freedom (Moghaddam, 2005). On the ground floor, degrees of freedom are high relative to degrees of freedom on the upper floors; individuals on the ground floor have a wider range of behavioral options. After people have become part of a terrorist group or network and reached the highest floor, the only options left open to them are to try to kill, or be killed or captured. 
Moderate social movement organizations are often internally fragmented along radical and moderate lines over what constitutes appropriate means and desirable ends (Tarrow, 1998). Such within-movement interactions often lead to breakaway groups seeking more radical goals and actions. In this shift, members of the group break away from the moderate path and take a radical activist route to promote or prevent social change. By breaking away, radicalizing group members turn their back on the society at large and on their fellow activists. This implies a “double marginalization,” both from society and from the movement (Della Porta, 1995, p. 107). Such double marginalization often implies material, social, and psychological isolation. The group’s isolation is an important factor in explaining its deviation from the “normal” perception of reality (Della Porta, 1995, p. 186) and strengthens the tendency toward violence (Della Porta, 1995, p. 51). Because of their isolation, group members come into significant contact only with others who share their worldview and emotions. In this narrower, ideologically homogeneous network, worldviews are created largely based on mediated experience, stereotypes, and prejudices shaping even more detached imagined realities. What group members feel, think, and do is severely restricted. In fact, in isolation, no deviance from the group norm is accepted and the degrees of freedom decline to nearly zero. 
The process of radicalization
Politicization and polarization are two interrelated but different group processes that are nested in the process of radicalization. Augmenting the conflict against the society at large may cause people who had stayed aloof to take sides in a struggle through which whole societies may polarize and groups radicalize. 
In all these processes, identification has a steering role. As for politicization, group identification not only strengthens shared grievances but also entails identification on a higher societal level. A politicized identity is by definition a nested identity in that it involves both identification with the aggrieved in-group and identification with the more inclusive entity that provides the context for shared grievances, adversarial attributions, and the ensuing power struggle for social change. Identity processes also play a crucial role in polarization. Research demonstrates that threats from counter-movements can shape a movement’s collective identity (Einwohner, 2002). First of all, the presence of powerful opponents makes identities more salient for activists (Van Dyke, 2003). Second, polarization implies a split in terms of friends and foes. Polarization, finally, also induces a strategic reformulation of “who we are.” Einwohner (2002), for instance, shows how animal rights activists responded to opponents’ claims that they were overly emotional by presenting alternate identity characteristics to the public, while in private they often embraced the “emotional” characterization. 
What Causes Radicalization?
Characteristics of the socio-political context foster or hinder processes of radicalization. These are not simple mechanisms as evidenced by the fact that people’s opinions, worries, and concerns are not linked in a straightforward manner to the structural characteristics of the context in which they develop. Take, for example, the observation that 34 percent of French citizens display an unfavorable attitude toward Muslims compared to 51 percent of the Dutch (PEW, 2005). If structural factors such as actual diversity were the only explanation for such intergroup attitudes, we would expect the French rather than the Dutch to be more negative about Muslims and thus more susceptible to radical appeals, because 9 percent of the French population is Muslim compared to 5.8 percent of the Dutch population (see Kinnvall and Nesbitt-Larkin, Chapter 10 in this volume). If, on the other hand, perceived threat is a major factor, one could understand that after the terrorist attacks in Madrid and London, Spanish (94 percent) and British (91 percent) citizens were more worried about terrorism and thus susceptible to radical beliefs and actions, but how can one make sense of the 96 percent of Portuguese who were even more concerned about terrorism? 
Figures like these illustrate that one should be careful in relating radicalization in a simple manner to characteristics of the socio-political context. Nor should one be satisfied with static conceptions such as “terrorist personality” (Taarnby, 2003, cited by Simon & Ruhs, 2008) to explain radicalization. 
Such arguments are not new. In fact, the main paradigm predicting radicalization in social movement studies departs from this idea. The so-called “end of protest cycle argument” (Della Porta, 1995; Della Porta & Tarrow, 1986) roots in the notion that although violence tends to appear from the very beginning of a protest cycle, the more dramatic forms of violence occur when the mass phase of the protest cycle is over. Clashes with opponents or the police during demonstrations are the more widely diffused types of political violence during the height of the cycle. In the last phase, aggression carried out by small groups of militants and direct attacks on persons become more frequent. Koopmans observes a similar pattern in the rise of racist and extreme right violence in Germany (Koopmans, 1997). Such violence as mobilization declines is attributed to people’s dissatisfaction with protest outcomes and their attempts to compensate for the “reduction in numbers” with increased radicalism (Della Porta, 1995), reinforced by a repression apparatus that becomes more effective toward the end of a cycle. 
Contextualizing radicalization
Radicalization has been thought to stem from a failure of the state to absorb the demands of frustrated, marginalized groups. These days, supranational processes such as globalization, European integration, and migration are seen to create new tensions and frustrated groups that demand changes in their own (radical) way. Taken together, these developments have created a context wherein conflicts are partly rooted in local tensions and the workings of national socio-political systems and partly in supranational developments such as globalization, Europeanization, and migration. Explanations of contemporary radicalization must therefore take national and supranational contexts into account. 
We argue that people can radicalize along two different routes: through participation in radical political parties or through participation in radical social movements. We agree with Kriesi (2009), who argues that by neglecting the electoral channel, social movement scholars tend to overlook the most important contemporary actor mobilizing against the consequences of globalization: the populist radical right parties. As a matter of fact, since the 1990s, right-wing populist parties are well represented in national politics in many Western European countries.
In what follows we present an explanatory framework for radicalization that combines these two routes: taking supranational next to national contexts into account and focusing on the political arena next to the social movement sector (see Figure 9.1). The explanatory framework departs from the notion that supranational processes shape and mold the micro level of (radicalizing) citizens’ demands, the meso level of social movements and political parties, and the macro level of national political systems. We proceed from the idea that the answer to questions such as who radicalizes, why people radicalize, and the forms radical action takes lies in the interaction of supranational processes, national political processes, and the context of political mobilization. 

<Insert Fig. 9.1 near here>
How supranational processes shape routes to radicalization
Radicalization now is different from 30 or 40 years ago. Flows of information (e.g., Internet, Twitter, text messaging, Facebook), resources, technology, ideas (e.g., consumerism, global justice, democracy), and people (migrants, refugees, tourists, but also activists; Tarrow 1998) have given the world a new look. Identities become politically relevant, groups feel threatened or socially excluded, and grievances transfer from one setting to the other and resonate in different contexts. Salient identities, fears, and frustrations are easily mobilized by parties and social movement organizations with a dominant role played by the media (Vliegenthart, 2007). Nations, in turn, react to these changes by enhancing repressive measures and restrictive citizenship regimes. 
We hold that major trends like globalization, European integration, and migration impact on the national political system and on the demand and supply side of politics in a country, be it party politics or movement politics. Such radicalization of demand and supply in the end results in political radicalization in the form of support for radical parties and/or radical movements. We will briefly discuss these elements of the process of radicalization.
Globalization. “Just as globalization speeds ahead and group-based differences seem to be disappearing, there is also an ethnic revival and the re-emergence of ethnic pride and ‘being different’” (Moghaddam, 2008, p. 4). Processes of globalization enhance inclusiveness, which as a consequence activates the need for differentiation. This is in line with Brewer’s optimal distinctiveness theory (Brewer, 1991). Brewer argues that people search for optimal distinctiveness and will attempt to restore the balance once it is disturbed. Globalization might disturb the balance resulting in attempts to restore. 
Europeanization. While European integration has progressed rapidly, individual member states have undergone uncertain internal transitions (Della Porta & Caiani, 2009). With respect to identification, the more inclusive European identity seems to enhance the need to belong and thus strengthen the perceived threats related to minority identities (cf. Brewer, 1999). Identification with France, for instance, as an in-group is central to the identity of most French people. To change such allegiances so that French citizens now feel themselves part of a much larger unit – a united Europe – would take generations. In contrast, the formal laws and political and economic systems creating the European Union (EU) are coming into being relatively quickly. Thus, there is a tension between the relatively fast changes at the macro level and the slower pace of change at the psychosocial level (Moghaddam, 2008). These contradictory pressures are captured by the concept of fractured globalization, that is, “the tendency for sociocultural disintegration to pull in a local direction at the same time that macro-economic and political systems are set up to accelerate globalization. A result is that local languages and cultures are under threat” (Moghaddam, 2008, p. 13). 
Migration. Migration has increased the diversity of Western societies tremendously. Large groups of people in Europe, both natives and migrants, try to protect their ways of life and compete for scarce resources such as jobs and houses as well as for political influence (Koopmans & Olzak, 2004). In this volatile context, intergroup conflicts increase the socio-political relevance and psychological salience of collective identities and thus the likelihood that social groups and their political entrepreneurs make collective claims and undertake attempts to mobilize their members for (extreme) collective action (e.g., for natives see Klandermans & Mayer, 2006; for immigrants see Klandermans, van der Toorn, & van Stekelenburg, 2008; Simon & Ruhs, 2008). Moghaddam (2008) argues that for a variety of reasons, Islamic terrorism will be a greater threat in Europe than in the United States. He suggests a “distance-travelled hypothesis” (Moghaddam, 2008, p. 11), which proposes that the distance immigrants have to travel in order to settle in a host country determines the (material, educational, and other) resources needed to succeed in the migration. Muslims need to have more resources to move from the Middle East and North Africa to settle in the United States than they do to settle in Europe. The greater resources of American Muslims in part explain the greater success of Muslims in the United States, particularly in terms of economic and educational attainment, relative to Muslims in Europe (Moghaddam, 2008). 
Together globalization, Europeanization, and migration have a profound impact on what Europeans currently think, feel, and do. Today’s societies are increasingly described in terms of uncertainties and threat (Moghaddam, 2008), fears (Bauman, 2006), and risk (Beck, 1992). Such collective fear enhances radicalization (Bar-Tal et al. 2007). 
Nation
Nations vary in how they react to globalization, Europeanization, and migration. The political opportunity structure, the openness of the political system for challengers, the access points available for people to defend their interests and express their opinions, the temporal political configuration, are all identified as determinants of the incidence and type of protest in democratic polities (e.g., Koopmans, 1999; Tarrow, 1998). Claims making by the extreme right, for instance, depends on a combination of discursive opportunities deriving from the prevailing model of citizenship and the political opportunities made available by mainstream parties for far-right mobilization (Koopmans, Statham, Giugni, & Passy, 2005). Citizenship regimes also impact on the formation of identities. Indeed, European countries are experimenting with an array of integration strategies, from extreme assimilation, that is, washing away intergroup differences (“Immigrants must become French”) to relativistic multiculturalism, that is, cherishing the intergroup differences (“sharia law can be implemented in Muslim homes”). These different citizenship regimes evoke different identity formation strategies of Muslims (see Kinnvall and Nesbitt-Larkin, Chapter 10 in this volume). 
Nations differ in terms of repressiveness as well. This is important because repression might radicalize the protesting group and further unite those people who are opposed to the state (Tarrow, 1998). This is what Della Porta (1995) shows in her comparative study between Germany and Italy: the more repressive the police, the more likely that radical elements grow within the movement. Violence by the rebellious group tends to bring repression, scaring away non-violent sympathizers, dividing the society, and resulting in a small group of militants whose politics revolve around violence and who get trapped in a violent conflict with state authorities (see de Koning & Meijer, Chapter 11 in this volume). 
Mobilizing context
To describe the mobilizing context wherein frustration and fear are molded and mobilized into radical political action, we borrow Klandermans’ (2004) “demand and supply” metaphor. The supply side of politics refers to social movement organizations, political parties, political entrepreneurs, and media in a society. The demand side of politics refers to the potential of citizens in a society susceptible to appeals for political action. Mobilization refers to the techniques and mechanisms employed to bring demand and supply together. 
Supply. In a longitudinal study on the immigration and integration debate in the Netherlands, Vliegenthart (2007) shows the tight reciprocal interaction between the political and media debate and anti-immigrant party support. What stands out is the dominant role of the media. Traditional media like newspapers appear to play a dominant role in radicalizing demand. Vliegenthart (2007) shows that the media are most strongly influenced by real-world developments, especially events such as 9/11; the media in turn influence the parliamentary debate and the public’s support for anti-immigrant parties. However, next to the influence of traditional media, we point to the influence of new media on radicalization. The term “CNN effect” has been coined to describe the influence of satellite news on intergroup conflicts in other parts of the world: “The idea is that a global conscience comes into being through the global mass media” (Moghaddam, 2008, p. 128). Through satellite television and the Internet, people are more informed about the struggles of their brothers and sisters worldwide with which they feel emotionally connected. New media spur intergroup conflict because “explosive import products” such as the war in Iraq or fights between activists and the police during a G20 summit are vividly transmitted (Etty, 2009) and facilitate the creation of global activist identities such as the Black Block and Jihadi Muslims. 
Increasingly we see protest participation rooted in everyday networks of participants and social movement actors involved in diffuse and decentralized networks (Duyvendak & Hurenkamp, 2004; Melucci, 1996; Taylor, 2000). This is also observed for extreme Islamic organizations (Lacquer, 1999). In Western Europe populist parties are running on platforms built upon issues related to anti-immigration, Euroskepticism, nationalism, and protection of cultural identity. 
Demand. We propose that perceived threat and social exclusion fuel radicalization especially if citizens do not trust their government to solve their problems. Globalization and migration create dynamics that serve to include some and exclude others in a connected but polarized global context. In societies where “threat is in the air” (Moghaddam, 2008), prejudice is high (Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007), just like hate toward other groups (van Stekelenburg, Oegema, and Klandermans, Chapter 13 in this volume), which fuels (radical) conflict behavior. Traditionally, young people are skeptical about the democratic process and the lower educated even more so (Campbell, 2006). Moreover, some scholars suggest that Islam is hostile to democratic values (e.g., (Kedourie, 1994). Hence, the most threatened and socially excluded groups in Europe tend also to be the groups who distrust their government and therefore run the risk of radicalization. 
Globalization and mass migration result in salient identities and ensuing clashes of ideologies (Moghaddam, 2005, 2008). Often groups that experience threatened identities are less concerned with policy and legalization than with cultural targets such as social norms, media representation, and cultural messages about the group. These groups do not so much reflect a desire to change government as they desire to create a cultural turn in which their cultural norms are accepted and they are treated with respect and dignity. Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans (2009) define this as a conflict of principle. Such conflicts easily turn into fierce confrontations as they cannot be solved by compromises like conflicts of interest. 
Mobilization. Globalization, European integration, and migration facilitate transnational activism. Increasing cross-national communication and exchange between people result in processes of diffusion and scale shift (Tarrow, 2005). The pace of diffusion is accelerated sharply by new media, which reduces dependence on personal relationships. Such new media help to steer loosely coupled structures (Lacquer, 1999) and make grievances, ideas, and ideologies travel rapidly from one context to the other. Moreover, social movement literature increasingly acknowledges that in response to globalization processes, social movement activity is uploaded to the transnational level and at the same time downloaded to the local level (e.g., Della Porta, Kriesi, & Rucht, 1999; Keck & Sikkink, 1998). All these studies show that the socio-political context in which movements operate to spread their aims and ideas is neither exclusively national, nor only supranational, but a mix of supranational, national, and local settings. Processes of rapid diffusion and scale shift in mobilization are exemplified by a global crisis of the ummah. This crisis is downloaded by European Muslims who locally reinterpret. Local conflicts are also uploaded, as the Danish cartoon conflict illustrates. 
Lack of the resources that give access to the polity may be another reason to resort to violent action repertoires, as may be the receptiveness of some (sub)cultures to violence (Della Porta, 1995). 
Conclusion
Our explanatory framework for contextualized radicalization integrates influences from the supranational, the national, and the mobilizing context. At a general level, radicalizing demand, supply, and mobilization are supposedly shaped by the supranational and national context. At a specific level, the mobilizing context is further colored by characteristics of the political arena, the social movement sector, and the role of media.
The framework presumes that there are two routes to radicalization: party politics or movement politics (see also Jenkins and Klandermans’ diamond model, 1995). Little is known about how these routes vary or interact, how such variation is determined, or how it impacts on who radicalizes, for what reasons, and why people take one route rather than the other. Of course, in trying to achieve social change, people will attempt to keep their costs and their risks to a minimum (cf. McAdam, 1986). Therefore, one can expect that citizens demanding radical social change initially prefer the low costs/risks route of party politics. However, this is only possible if there is a supply of radical party politics that impresses as effective. Kriesi’s (2009) suggestion that the extreme right mobilizes via party politics seems to be confirmed by the supply of populist extreme right political parties in many European countries. The radical left, on the other hand, tends to choose movement politics. Hence, movement politics have been dominated by the so called “left-libertarian movement family” (Della Porta & Rucht, 1995), although in the United States we do encounter radical right movements (e.g., anti-abortion and recently the so-called tea parties, a radical right anti-government campaign). Thus, we expect the radical left such as the “Autonomous” Black Block to opt for the movement route, if only because globalization and Europeanization have made them critical to the legitimacy of democracy. This might also be a reason for Islamic Jihadi’s opt for the social movement route. 
A final interesting issue is the relation between the two routes. As far as moderate political participation is concerned, the two routes have always been intimately related. That is to say, people who participate in party politics are also likely to participate in movement politics (Barnes & Kaase, 1979). However, if the route via the political representational system does not live up to citizens’ expectations, chances are that the protest route via social movements will be used more frequently. This raises the question whether the two routes for radical political participation are as intimately related as those for moderate forms of participation, and to what extent failing radical party politics would similarly make people shift to movement politics.
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Figure 1: Contextualized routes to radicalization 
	  Route 1 to radicalism: radicalization of the social movements organisations
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